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Preface 
The author, Professor Robert Ayres, was not at IIASA when he wrote this 
paper, although he is co-principal investigator of the Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing (CIM) Project at IIASA. The subject of the paper is highly 
relevant and reflects some of his work at IIASA, so it seems worthwhile to 
make the paper available to a wider audience. 
F. SCHMIDT-BLEEK 
Program Leader 
Technology, Economy, and Society 
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US Competitiveness in Manufacturing 
ROBERT U. AYRES 
Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 
This paper reviews the 'competitiveness' debate from several points of view and then focuses attention on the Jonget-
term prospects for US manufacturers. It concludes that, because US firms have had an earlier start in learning to use 
computers, leading-edge US firms are well situated to lead the way to fully computerized automation or 'computer-
integrated manufacturing'. The current evidence is mixed but not inconsistent with the possibility that US-based 
manufacturers will be able to regain some Jost ground in the next decade. 
INTRODUCTION 
The topic of this paper is at the center of a great 
controversy which, as often happens, confuses several 
different issues. For the sake of clarity, one should 
make an effort tO' distinguish them. One issue, itself 
compounded of several parts, concerns the long-term 
health of the US economy, the impact of 'Reaganom-
ics' and the problem of debt, the trade imbalance and 
the federal deficit, and the instability and the apparent 
long-term weakening of the US dollar as an inter-
national currency. This may be termed the macroecon-
omic aspect of competitiveness. A separate but related 
set of issues that has been brought into focus recently 
by the Report of the President's Commission on 
Industrial Competitiveness [PCIC, 1985] and by a 
provocative book by Cohen and Zysman (1986) can be 
summarized by the question: does manufacturing re-
ally matter if we are moving into an era of services and 
information? There is a school of economists (among 
whom are some of the strongest advocates of free trade 
in the current debate) that believes (or seems to) that 
the 'hollowing' of US industry is a phenomenon of no 
intrinsic importance. They argue that this is merely a 
reflection of global restructuring and rationalization. 
By this logic, in fact, hollowing must be a good thing as 
long as it is a consequence of unfettered market forces. 
A third, and conceptually distinct, question con-
cerns the actual competitive situation of US manufac-
turing industry vis-a-vis Japan and Western Europe. 
Even with this narrower context it will be important to 
distinguish between various industrial sectors, since 
some are doing far better than others. A subtler but no 
less important distinction to be made is between the 
state of affairs as reflected in terms of current market 
shares and profitability and the longer-term prospects. 
This point is critical, because there is a spectrum of 
strategic responses between the 'quick fix' and the total 
rethink. 
The paper will briefly sketch the context and then 
focus on the specific issue defined by the title. 
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MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Let us begin by recapitulating some of the 'good news'. 
In terms of GDP per capita in ' real' terms (adjusted for 
inflation and relative prices or 'purchasing power 
parity') the United States has actually gained on other 
major industrialized countries (with the exception of 
Japan) in the period 1970--85, according to OECD 
data (Ladd, 1987). For example, West Germany pro-
duced 83% of the US GDP per capita in 1970 and 
89% in 1980, but this had fallen to 74% by 1985. The 
United Kingdom had 74% of US output per capita in 
1970 but only 66% in 1985, and so on. Japan, which 
was at the 64% level in 1970, on the other hand, was 
only up to 71 % by 1985. The period 1980-85, in 
particular, was good for the United States, or bad for 
Europe, or both. Of course, this was the period of 
soaring federal budget deficits, marked by an very 
large inflow of foreign capital. Perhaps it should not 
surprise anyone, on reflection, that Americans ap-
peared to be producing much more per capita in 1985 
relative to the other industrial countries (including 
Japan) than in 1980. We financed this extra growth, to 
some extent, with foreign savings. Nevertheless, these 
figures hardly seem cons.istent with the notion of a 
chronic and increasing lack of competitiveness. At the 
very least, one is forced to do some explaining away. 
More macroeconomic evidence that requires some 
explaining away if the 'lack of competitiveness' thesis is 
to be sustained is the fact that employment in the 
manufacturing sector itself appears to be holding up 
remarkably well in numbers, though declining slowly 
in percentage terms. In fact, manufacturing employ-
ment in 1986 was almost exactly the same as in 1966, 
i.e. about 19.2 million workers (Birch, 1987). Yet 
employment in some important industries has un-
doubtedly declined considerably (as their unions can 
attest), and it is reported that the Fortune 500 com-
panies have eliminated 2.8 million jobs between 1980 
and 1986 alone. Clearly, something strange is going on. 
What appears to be happening is that, on average, 
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large companies are getting smaller, at least in terms of 
their workforce. Even IBM has stopped adding new 
jobs. At the same time it seems that many small labor-
intensive manufacturing firms are being started. It is 
these smaller companies that are creating the jobs that 
replace those eliminated by the large ones. In fact, 
according to the National Commission on Jobs and 
Small Business (NCJSB, 1987), firms with fewer than 
500 employees generate 60% of all new jobs. 
The trend toward smaller producers seems to hold 
true even in the troubled metalworking industry 
(Hicks, 1986). It is not hard to find examples of the 
decline of the giants and the rise of the pygmies. In the 
steel industry every large integrated producer has had 
to cut back considerably in both output and employ-
ment, and several have disappeared as a result of 
bankruptcy (for example, Youngstown) or merger (for 
example, Republic) or have restructured as much 
smaller companies (for example, National, Armco). 
Jones & Laughlin (J & L) is the latest casualty, but 
probably not the last. Yet scores of small, efficient, 
non-unionized 'minimills' have emerged in recent 
years, some of which have grown into major enter-
prises (for example, Florida Steel, Nucor). These com-
panies have increased their market share continuously, 
and have been highly profitable. Some of them have 
also begun to introduce advanced new technologies. 
The minimill scenario is not unique. In other manufac-
turing sectors some small companies seem to be 
performing much better than most large ones. Since 
protectionism usually benefits the larger companies 
preferentially (after all, they pay for the lobbyists), a 
good case can be made that it would end up helping 
the inefficient and thus harming the efficient. This, 
however, is not the usual argument. 
Not all the news is good, by any means, and even the 
good news may not be as good as it looks. The strong 
US performance in terms of aggregate job creation and 
GDP growth (adjusted for relative prices) is seemingly 
percent 
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contradicted by the published data on productivity 
growth in manufacturing. This shows the United 
States lagging far behind Japan (and considerably 
behind France and West Germany) during the same 
fifteen-year period (1970-85), as indicated in Fig. I. 
Yet simple international comparisons of aggregate 
productivity growth may also be quite misleading in 
that output (the numerator of the productivity equa-
tion) is measured only in dollars, with inadequate 
allowance for changes in composition or quality. In 
particular, it is important to consider the increasing 
absolute share of computers and related products and 
the remarkable improvements in performance per 
dollar that have occurred since 1970. Whereas most 
products have changed relatively little in two decades 
in terms of performance, computers have changed 
considerably. Scattered data suggest that the cost of 
'number-crunching' has fallen by more than a factor of 
I 00 since 1970, and for some applications the differ-
ence is even greater. The US Department of Commerce 
finally generated a 'computer price index' in 1986, 
going back to 1972, which shows a more modest 
fifteenfold decline. However, there is, as yet, no esti-
mate of the value (or cost) of the cumulative invest-
ment in software, without which the hardware would 
be useless. Yet it is commonly suggested that software 
costs now exceed those of hardware by as much as a 
factor of three. 
Moreover, the United States is still far ahead of the 
rest of the industrial world in terms of the penetration 
of computers in some critical areas of use, notably 
office work and design applications. Bearing these 
points in mind, might not the standard 'productivity 
growth' figures be seriously misleading, as some have 
argued? The jury is still out on this question, largely 
because the evidence so far suggests that business 
consumers of computers have not (yet) demonstrated 
significant benefits, in the aggregate, from their very 
large cumulative investment. It seems, in short, that 
0 
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Figure 1. Productivity (real GOP per employed person): average annual percentage change, 196063. 
(Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, December 1984 (unpublished).) 
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'white collar' productivity has not been increasing 
(Strassman, 1985; Baily, 1986; Bowen, 1986). Indeed, a 
detailed study of the financial industry (banks), which 
was one of the first to adopt computers on a massive 
scale, and for which very good data are available, 
reveals that capital intensity has increased significantly 
since 1960 while real return on equity has declined 
sharply (Franke, 1986). Thus the productivity of capi-
tal has plummeted. Based on an index of 100 in 1948, 
capital productivity measured 113.83 in 1960, 66.65 in 
1970 and only 28.12 in 1983. During the same period, 
labor productivity increased slowly from 120 (1960) to 
a peak of 140 (1975) but has declined since then 
(Ibid). 
There are several possible explanations for these 
phenomena, but the 'bottom line' is that the available 
productivity statistics could just as well be interpreted 
as implying that productivity growth has slowed down 
in the financial sector precisely because it invested a lot 
of capital in ultimately unproductive ways. Since com-
puters accounted for roughly one third of all invest-
ment in producers' durable equipment in 1982 and 
every dollar of expenditure on computer hardware 
entailed up to three dollars of expenditure on software 
(mostly uncapitalized) the same general conclusion 
might possibly hold for the whole US manufacturing 
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sector. The correct interpretation of these numbers 
must await future clarification by events. 
MICROECONOMIC CONTEXT 
The most direct measure of competitiveness is ability 
to sell in world markets. Here, too, the recent trend has 
been very disquieting (see Figs 2 and 3). The United 
States has had a trade deficit in raw materials and 'low 
tech' manufactured products for two decades, but until 
recently this has been compensated, in part, by a 
substantial and reliable surplus in the so-called 'high 
tech' sector, including computers, semiconductors, 
telecommunications gear, aerospace and pharmaceu-
ticals. In 1980 the positive trade balance in these 
sectors amounted to $26.6 billion, but in 1982 this 
figure began to fall sharply. It became negative, for the 
first time, in 1986, when the United States imported 
$2.6 billion more in the 'high tech' sectors than it 
exported. Undoubtedly the sharp rise in the US dollar 
from 1982 through spring 1985 contributed, but the 
dollar" has fallen nearly 50% since then against all 
major foreign currencies, with only a modest and 
recent improvement in the trade picture. Part of the 
reason has to be that many US plants have closed 
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Figure 2. US shares of world high-technology exports, 1965 and 1980. (Source: US 
Department of Commerce.) 
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Figure 3. US high-technology trade balance. (Source: US Department of Com-
merce.) 
permanently and many manufacturers are now so 
dependent on foreign suppliers that a declining dollar 
merely increases their costs. 
In some industries the US manufacturers have 
disappeared, or nearly so: examples include mass 
transit equipment, motorcycles (Harley-Davidson has 
returned from near-bankruptcy, with help from the 
government, but it still has a very small market share), 
radios, tape-recorders, hi-fi audio equipment, tele-
visions (except for Zenith), watches, cameras (except 
for Polaroid) and small digital pocket calculators. 
Another major loss is the low-priced end of the 
xerographic copier business, which was a worldwide 
monopoly of the Xerox Corporation as recently as 
1970 before its patent protection expired. 
Even in the semiconductor industry, which was 
created in the United States less than a generation ago, 
significant segments seem to have moved to Japan 
permanently. For example, the specialized ceramics 
used for chip substrates are almost a Japanese mon-
opoly. The United States now has only 5% of the 
merchant DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Mem-
ory) chip market, which was initially created by the 
innovation oflntel Corp in 1969 (Fig. 4). Intel itself has 
long since abandoned that business because of losses. 
In fact the US Defense Department has become so 
concerned about the erosion of US manufacturing 
capabilities in this field that a $250 million per year 
industry- government venture, called Sematech, is be-
ing pushed through Congress by the Pentagon. It is 
worth noting that Charles Sporck, President of Natio-
nal Semiconductor- and one of the strongest in-
dustrial proponents of the proposed government inter-
vention- has been quoted as saying that, even if 
Sematech is launched, it would take five years to 'catch 
up' with the Japanese (Sporck, 1987). 
There are major long-term costs associated with 
dropping out of any important technology market. 
For example, when US manufacturers were beaten by 
the Japanese in the fast-growing digital watch and 
pocket calculator industries in the early 1970s they 
also fell seriously behind in the race to develop the 
specialized chip-making technology (CMOS) that was 
utilized for very low-power consumption devices. This 
_became a Japanese speciality. Later it was the prefer-
red technology for DRAMs, which partly explains why 
the Japanese also took that market away from US 
firms. CMOS devices are also becoming very import-
ant in the telecommunications industry, which re-
quires many devices such as amplifiers and repeaters 
that are powered by the very low voltages in telephone 
circuits. US semiconductor firms are now trying to get 
back into this field, but the Japanese have the lead 
today. In fact, the Materials Advisory Board of the 
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Figure 4. World market for RAMs (millions of units). (Source: Dataquest.) 
National Research Council has recently reported that 
they are leading the United States in seven out of ten 
important emerging materials-related technologies, in-
cluding optical lithography and optoelectronic in-
tegrated circuits. The latter may be the most important 
single technology of the 1990s (Robinson, 1986a). 
Small, high-performance, reliable mechanical de-
vices have long been a Japanese specialty. Beginning 
with cameras, watches and tape recorders, Japan now 
also makes the majority of the printers, disk drives, 
keyboards and monitors used in personal computers. 
In fact, nearly 75% of the manufacturing value-added 
for the original IBM PC was from Japan, Singapore or 
South Korea, and only the final assembly was carried 
out in the United States. Growing Japanese expertise 
in precision manufacturing also found ready appli-
cation in the automotive and machine-tool industries, 
including their offshoot, the robotics industry. It is no 
accident that one of the leading manufacturers of 
precision assembly robots is Seiko, the world's largest 
watchmaker, which developed its first industrial ro-
bots to assemble watches. The high standards of 
quality associated with Japanese products in general 
owe a great deal to the experience gained in the 
consumer product lines that Japan took away from the 
United States and Europe in the 1960s. 
While US manufacturers are learning some lessons 
and improving their own performance, many of the 
losses are likely to be permanent. For example, 
Nissan's US subsidiary (Smyrna, Ohio) has a 'local 
content' of about 60%, but only 37% of the compo-
nents it buys from outside suppliers are US-made. In 
the case of Honda, the most successful of the Japanese 
'immigrants', local content is only 45%. A Honda 
spokesman has commented in regard to this (Financial 
Times, 1987): 
American vendors are now doing well on quality 
and price. But there is a wide variety of parts we 
need for which the technology and design capability 
simply does not exist in the US. 
The recent bloodbath among US machine-tool and 
robot manufacturers is certainly attributable, in part, 
to the fact that Japanese manufacturers of the basic 
components, such as motors and motor controls, not 
to mention gearwheels, nuts and bolts, are now more 
competent than their US counterparts. Unimation, the 
robot pioneer which had about 40% of the US market 
when it was aquired by Westinghouse in 1983, saw its 
sales drop by nearly a factor of two (from $70 million 
to $38 million) during a three-year period when total 
worldwide sales of robots increased considerably. The 
Cincinnati Milacron T3 robot did not fare much 
better. The problem was that both robots were (and 
are) hydraulic machines, which were strong and re-
liable but comparatively inaccurate. When industry 
demanded greater accuracy- which could only be 
provided by electrically driven machines- Unima-
tionjWestinghouse and Cincinnati Milacron were too 
slow to respond, and the advantage passed quickly to 
Japan. 
The story in machine tools has been similar. In the 
mid-1970s the United States was a net exporter, due in 
part to a technological lead in numerical control 
technology. The great investment in new plants and 
equipment by the US auto industry following the 
1973-4 'oil shock' resulted in a period of great pros-
perity for the domestic machine-tool industry in the 
late 1970s, but it also led to lengthening delivery times 
and opened the door for foreign competition. The 
Japanese sharply increased their capacity to meet this 
demand, and then reacted to the recession after 1981 
7 
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by cutting prices and standardizing products. The US 
share in world production of machine tools fell from 
19.4% in 1981 to only 10.8% in 1983, with a slight 
rebound to 12. 7% in 1984, whereas the Japanese share 
rose from 11%to22.5% in 8 years (Fig. 5). From 1981 
to 1986 300 out of800 US machine-tool manufacturers 
have disappeared, and employment fell from 110000 
to 70000 (Wall Street Journal, 1987). The survivors are 
mostly in severe financial difficulties, and unable to 
finance either new product development on a signifi-
cant scale or modernization of their own obsolete 
production facilities. 
The demand for machine tools began to pick up 
again after 1983, but foreign firms now command 
nearly 50% of the US domestic market. Worse, major 
categories of machine tools are no longer available 
from US producers. One of the most telling illus-
trations is the fact that when GM recently retooled its 
body-parts plant at Mansfield, Ohio, it replaced old, 
manually operated stand-alone presses by a set of 
programmable ones linked by a transfer line. US 
producers lacked the experience and the ability to 
manufacture these machines in the required size and 
Japanese and West German firms got the business. 
The Japanese manufacturer, in particular, was able to 
develop the technology because it had assurances of a 
market to the Japanese auto industry, something GM 
would not give any US manufacturer. The next time a 
US auto company wants to buy such equipment it will 
probably have no option except to buy Japanese. 
The problem, in short, is that competition can have 
favorable effects on efficiency and entrepreneurialism, 
but not all effects are favorable. When competition is 
extreme, the losers go out of business and the winners 
gain a lead that may be permanent and insurmount-
able. The United States has already lost a lot of its 
industrial capability, and much of what remains is 
vulnerable to further erosion. 
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HOW ARE WE DOING IN THE RACE TO COM-
PUTER-INTEGRATED MANUFACTURING? 
The main arguments to be made in the remainder of 
this paper are as follows. On the one hand, although 
the United States was the source of almost all the key 
technological innovations (to date) needed for CIM it 
has been slow to apply some of this new technology on 
the factory floor. Not only Japan but also Sweden and 
West Germany (as well as East Germany and Czechos-
lovakia) have forged ahead in certain areas such as 
applications of numerically controlled machine tools, 
robots and manufacturing cells or 'flexible manufac-
turing systems' (FMS). Recent trends in the latter area 
are summarized in Fig. 6. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the United 
States is still ahead of the rest of the world, including 
Japan, in applications of microcomputers (PCs), com-
puter-aided-design (CAD) and in manufacturing areas 
that depend very heavily on design, such as micro-
processors and computers themselves. For example, 
continuing US strength in commercial airliners andjet 
engines can be attributed to this advantage, in all 
probability. 
The evidence of US competitive strength in these 
design-intensive areas is not hard to find. Despite 
undoubted Japanese strength in microelectronics and 
high-precision 'mechatronics', Japan has yet to make 
significant inroads in the US market for personal 
computers- by far the world's largest ($22.5 billion in 
1986). IBM is being challenged mainly by other US 
manufacturers such as Apple, Tandy, Compaq and 
Zenith. (However, Japanese firms are entering the 
market with lap-top portables.) In the minicomputer 
market DEC has recently strengthened its lead over 
(mainly American) rivals like IBM, Data General, 
Hewlett-Packard, Prime and Honeywell. The world 
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Figure 5. Machine-tool production of selected countries: percentage share of world totals. 
(Source: ECE, 1986.) 
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market for packaged CAD systems in almost a US 
monopoly, with pioneer Computervision being chal-
lenged by Intergraph and half a dozen other US 
companies (including GE, IBM and Apple). Engineer-
ing workstations is another area of US dominance, 
with Sun Microsystems, Apollo, Convergent Techno-
logies, IBM and others fighting for temporary lead-
ership. In this important corner of the industrial world 
there is no doubt of US competitiveness. On the other 
hand, Gilder (1987) is an order of magnitude too 
optimistic in saying 'While American economists ulul-
ated about declining competitiveness, we won the 
competition'. 
In all fairness, the competition is not over- far from 
it. Neither Japan nor, for that matter, Western Europe 
has withdrawn or conceded defeat. Japan's 'fifth gener-
ation' computer project has brought that country far 
closer to the research frontier than was the case a 
decade ago and, if past experience is to be relied upon 
as a guide, Japanese strength in manufacturing is likely 
to tip the balance away from the United States in any 
area of technology that emerges from the fast-chang-
10 R. U. AYRES 
ing 'childhood' phase of the lifecycle into the 'ado-
lescent' one, with its greater emphasis on standard-
ization and cost reduction to propel market growth. 
Sometimes this transition occurs almost overnight, as 
in the case of the DRAM. There is reason to believe 
that such a transition may be coming shortly for 
microprocessor technology, in that the recently intro-
duced 32-bit microprocessors (Motorola and Intel) are 
not likely to be replaced by 64-bit designs for many 
years, if ever. This could be the opening the Japanese 
have been waiting for to make their move into the 
mini- and microcomputer business. 
The unresolved question that remains is: can US-
based manufacturers hope to compete in the future? 
Can they hope to make up lost ground? There are no 
firm answers to these questions. The situation is, to say 
the least, 'fluid'. However, there are indications-so 
far, rather scattered-that the worst of the rot may be 
over. As for the prospects for regaining lost ground, it 
is possible, but very far from certain. 
The adverse factors have been widely discussed. 
Among them are the short-term 'bottom line' orien-
tation of many US executives, especially those trained 
to think of manufacturing operations only as financial 
assets (for example, Hayes and Abernathy, 1980). 
Another persistent ·problem cited by some economists 
(albeitd is pointed to others) is the relatively high real 
cost of capital in the United States compared with 
Japan. (Hatsopoulos, 1986). Still another serious in-
stitutional problem is the way in which the traditional 
rules of accounting (inadvertently) induce managers to 
focus ex<:essively on labor cost reduction (bearing in 
mind that direct labor typically accounts for only 
about 15% of total manufacturing costs, down from 
25% in 1970) while neglecting other, more important 
opportunities for improving performance such as in-
ventory reduction and quality improvement (Kap\an, 
1986; Howell et al., 1987). 
A further fundamental problem is the scarcity of 
manufacturing engineering talent in the United States 
compared with Japan and West Germany. There is 
growing evidence that this scarcity is largely attribut-
able to the squeeze between a limited supply, on the 
one hand, and increased demand for e.ngineers by 
defense industries, on the other. Supply problems, in 
turn, are partly due to the long neglect of science and 
mathematics education in secondary schools, aggra-
vated by the withdrawal of federal resources from 
higher education in general. Another factor in the 
equation is the superior financial attractiveness of law 
and business careers to the best and smartest students. 
Taking all these points into consideration, the manu-
facturing engineering shortage in the United States is 
likely to continue for many years. 
In addition to the managerial and educational fac-
tors tending to reduce US competitiveness, govern-
ment policy plays a very significant negative role. It is 
indisputable that many policies, from antitrust, to 
immigration, to international security-motivated ex-
port controls, have hurt US firms' ability to compete 
internationally. The so-called 'CoCom system', which 
is supposed to co-ordinate such restrictions among all 
industrialized countries, has been, in practice, a bad 
joke. This was recently revealed by the willingness of 
Toshiba to sell its most advanced nine-axis machining 
centers directly to the Soviet Union for the purpose of 
manufacturing submarine propellers, while the Penta-
gon has successfully prevented US firms from selling 
commercial products such as 32-bit microcomputers 
and chip-making equipment, even to Western coun-
tries in some cases. The recent bankruptcy of GCA 
Corp., formerly the leading manufacturer of some 
categories of advanced chip-making machines, has 
handed over this market to Nikon and Canon. This 
unfortunate event can probably be laid at the door of 
the Pentagon, which interfered with GCA's attempts 
to sell in Asia. 
Worse, from the point of view of competitiveness, 
the Pentagon often does not buy advanced com-
mercial products already available, preferring obsol-
escent hardware developed to its own specifications 
from its established network of suppliers. Thus the role 
of the military in providing sustaining domestic mar-
kets for innovative technologies has declined sharply 
since the 1950s and 1960s. Meanwhile, lack of effective 
competition, or excessive tinkering with designs after 
production has started, have resulted in very large cost 
differentials between military and civilian production, 
even for very similar items. The net effect is to choke off 
the transfer of military technology to civilian purposes 
and the economic benefits that formerly accrued from 
this process. 
Having said all this, there is actually some good 
news to report. There are some farsighted leaders in 
US industry who have decided to invest in long-term 
survival as manufacturers by trying to skip a techno-
logical generation, despite the negative short-term 
impact on profitability and declining popularity on 
Wall Street. Whereas the United States has unques-
tionably lagged in terms of retrofitting robots and 
manufacturing cells or FMS in existing plants (Jaik-
umar, 1986), some of the 'flagships' of US manufac-
turing industry such as IBM, Kodak, Boeing, General 
Electric, Westinghouse, General Telephone and Gen-
eral Motors have invested tens of billions of dollars in 
completely redesigned computer-integrated manufac-
turing (CIM) systems going far beyond the introduc-
tion of robots or FMS per se. 
The early returns have not all been favorable. For 
exatnple, both IBM and GM have apparently slipped 
in terms of short-term profitability in comparison with 
their closest rivals. There have been setbacks, some of 
which are reported in the Wall Street Journal. For 
instance, it is said the GM's new Hamtramck assembly 
plant, which cost $500 million, is no better in quality 
and productivity than the GM- Toyota joint venture 
in the old Fremont (Cal) plant, which is much less 
technologically advanced, but utilizes Toyota's system 
of management (The Economist, 1987). GM's $400 
million new Buick City facility at Flint also incorpor-
ates major technological advances, including flexible 
tooling, but it took twice as long to get the new system 
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debugged as had been planned, and some critics are 
saying that its expected benefits are illusory. The 
ambitious Saturn project is now the subject of 
considerable second-guessing, and GM has resorted to 
major layoffs of middle managers to improve its short-
term financial performance. In a similar vein it is said 
that GE paid too much for its $600 million CIM 
dishwasher plant in St Louis, as <lid IBM for its 
new $350 million CIM typewriter plant in Lexington, 
Ky. 
On the other hand, some of the new plants appear 
to be resounding successes, by any standards. For 
instance, Westinghouse's new College Station (Tex) 
circuit-board assembly plant cut space requirements 
by 40%, labor content by 45%, inventories by 55%, 
material losses by 70% and manufacturing cycle time 
by 75%. Moreover, the parent plant (Baltimore) was 
getting a 15- 20% composite yield in 198~typical of 
US plants. At College Station the yield of perfect 
circuit boards, on the first pass, is now up to 95% and 
rising (Murrin, 1987). 
It is possible that, from the longer-term perspective 
(which US executives have been accused of neglecting), 
the 'disappointments' that have been experienced are 
the inevitable and necessary cost of learning how to 
integrate a factory and link it, by computer, to others. 
Subsequent attempts will be less expensive and will 
work better. Fewer mistakes will be made. 
General Motors, for one, is far too deeply commit-
ted to back out. Its factories contain some 200000 
programmable machine tools and robots. GM intends 
to link its many 'islands of automation' together (i.e. 
make them communicate with each other) and put 
them all under the control of centralized computers. 
To do so it has pioneered the creation of a 'manufac-
turing automation protocol' (MAP), to which over 
1000 manufacturers of computers, controls and pro-
grammable equipment have already subscribed. It 
purchased Electronic Data Systems (EDS) for $2.6 
billion to facilitate the process. GM began the actual 
'wiring up' at a truck assembly plant in Pontiac, Mich, 
in the spring of 1986. The company has targeted 1990 
as the deadline for having all its new flexibly auto-
mated plants interconnected and linked by MAP to 
the corporate headquarters. 
The critics, both inside and outside the company, 
who point out that Toyota currently achieves results 
as good, or better, without fancy automation are 
probably missing the point. Toyota may be able 
to achieve still better results in the future than it does 
now, by continuing along its present lines of incremen-
tal improvements with minimum automation, but it 
will eventually have to do what GM is doing now, 
while competing with a tougher adversary. Mean-
while, GM can apply the lessons it is now learning 
from Toyota at Fremont to make still further gains of 
its own in the future if, needless to say, all goes 
according to plan. 
As of the middle of 1988 it has been estimated that the 
United States has already built as many as 130 CIM 
factories. By comparison, there are very few- if any-
in Europe or Japan. Since this very large investment 
(about $50 billion from 1981 through 1986) has yet to 
pay off in terms of measurable increases in produc-
tivity or improvements in the balance of trade it is 
being derided as a failure. To be sure, even Ford and 
Chrysler cannot afford to spend on GM's scale, and 
most companies must be far more modest in their 
ambitions. On the other hand, most companies do not 
have GM's considerable bureaucracy and ingrained 
NIH ('not invented here') tradition to be overcome. 
For a smaller company, needless to say, the necessary 
scale of investment is also smaller. What such com-
panies cannot afford is to pay a disproportionate share 
of the learning costs only to have the benefits become 
quickly available to competitors. However, it is in-
creasingly clear that this is not a real problem, in the 
case of CIM, in that the knowledge of 'how' to 
integrate is not the province of computer companies 
(except in their own plants) nor that of the consulting 
engineering companies. Each company really has to do 
the job for itself, first by understanding its own manu-
facturing process thoroughly, then by simplifying it as 
much as possible and finally by automating and 
computerizing. A thorough job of training (or re-
training) the labor force is also a prerequisite to 
success. 
The major lesson of the well-publicized 'failures' is 
probably that the simplification step had been given 
too little attention, relative to the computerization. 
The Japanese are particularly effective in this area, 
which accounts for much of their current competitive 
success. One succinct summary of the strategy now 
being adopted by many US firms is 'learn what the 
Japanese do, then automate it'. The first half of this 
strategy is now well under way and the second half is 
beginning. The comparative advantage may shift, since 
US firms have invested much more in computers-
especially software- over the past 30 years than either 
Japanese or Europeans. Whereas Japanese manufac-
turers are much more efficient on the plant floor than 
their US counterparts, the opposite may be true in the 
office. Certainly, the United States is far ahead in terms 
of office applications of PCs (about 10: I). Although 
the payoff from hundreds of billions of dollars of 
computer investment is hard to measure (at least in 
terms of 'white collar productivity'), the fault may well 
be in the measurement methodology, or it may be that 
gains have been obscured by other factors such 
as additional paperwork imposed by government 
regulation or created by bureaucratic middle man-
agers. 
Most likely, a major obscuring factor is the length of 
time.it has taken people (and organizations) to learn to 
use these tools properly. If this is true, then European 
and Japanese firms still have much of this learning 
ahead of them. Thus while far from certain it is not 
implausible that the benefits of CIM will be achieved 
first by the United States. In this case the current 
situation of poor US performance in international 
competition may only be temporary. The next few 
years should be interesting. 
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